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COURT OF APPEALS, 1960 TERM
slow down if proceeding through a red light, the jury may still consider whether
he may have assumed that the defendant would concede the right of way.
A final, and fatal error, was the refusal of the trial court to instruct the
jury that a violation of an ordinance is evidence of negligence.86 New York
is in agreement with the majority rule in that such a violation, although not
conclusive or presumptive of negligence, is nevertheless evidence of negligence.
R.A.O.
ERROR TO INTRODUCE QUESTIONS UNANSWERED BY DEFENDANTS

In People v. Bianculi,8 7 the evidence produced at the trial was sufficient to
sustain the defendants' convictions; however, a unanimous Court of Appeals
reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial because of substantial error
in admitting certain evidence. The prosecutor persistently interrogated police
officers and one of the defendants in regard to certain questions asked by police
officers to the defendants immediately after their arrest. The prosecutor also
emphasized that the defendants refused to answer any of the questions.
On appeal, the defendants' contention was that the questions could not
be admitted into evidence and did not form a foundation for an admission or a
confession. The trial judge had ruled that each of the defendants was "under no
obligation to speak [after his arrest], but whether or not he spoke may be a
circumstance that the jury may want to know."88 Conceding the truth of the
trial judge's observation, the Court of Appeals declared that such questions
followed by silence have a great impact on the minds of jurors. The jurors are
led to believe that silence is equivalent to an admission of guilt, for if the
defendants were innocent, they would have denied the charges. Such an
inference is totally inconsistent with the defendants' exercising the right to
remain silent, and the State must not be permitted to call to the attention of the
jury that the defendants refused to answer incriminatory statements after
arrest.8 9 The probative value of such evidence is clearly negligible.
The decision represents no change in New York law, as the earlier decision,
People v. Travato,90 is directly in point.
Bd.
STANDARD FOR DIRECTED VERDICT

In Woodson v. New York City Housing Authority,91 the plaintiff brought
an action for assault, false arrest and false imprisonment. The plaintiff, an
interested witness, and a disinterested observer, who corroborated the plaintiff's
testimony, testified in regard to the factual circumstances, and the defendant
rested at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case. In the charge to the jury, the
86. Major v. Waverly & 'Ogden, 7 N.Y.2d 332, 192 N.Y.S.2d 165 (1960).
87. 9 N.Y.2d 468, 215 N.Y.S.2d 33 (1961).
88. Respondent's Brief, 7779 Cases & Points, Case 6, p. 24.
89. People v. Travato, 309 N.Y. 382, 131 N.E.2d 557 (1955) ; Cf. People v. Rutigliano,
261 N.Y. 103, 184 NE. 689 (1933).
90. Supra note 89.
91. 10 N.Y.2d 30, 217 N.Y.S.2d 31 (1961).

BUFFALO LAW REVIEW

trial judge declared: "I instruct you that as a matter of law Officer Davies [the
agent of the defendant] did in fact assault and falsely arrest and imprison plaintiff. Therefore, the only question remaining for you to determine is whether these
acts were committed within the scope of Davies' employment as a Housing
Authority Officer." 92 The Appellate Division, in reversing the trial court on
the basis of the incorrect charge, declared that the defendant's resting did not
necessarily amount to a concession of the facts establishing liability. 3 In
addition, even though the testimony of an interested witness is not impeached
or contradicted, the fact that he is interested places a cloud upon the truthfulness or accuracy of the testimony. The jury should be entitled to pass on the
94
issue of credibility.
The Court of Appeals approved the charge of the trial court and reversed
the decision of the Appellate Division in the instant case. Where the evidence
presented by the interested party "is not contradicted by direct evidence, nor by
any legitimate inferences from the evidence, and it is not opposed to the
probabilities; nor in its nature, surprising, or suspicious, there is no reason
for denying to it conclusiveness." 95 The Court held that the testimony of the
plaintiff fulfilled these requirements and, in addition, was corroborated by a
disinterested observer; therefore, the issues as to assault, false arrest and false
imprisonment were properly taken out of the domain of the jury 00
In order to substantiate further its opinion, the Court relied on the
presumption that arrest and imprisonment without a warrant are unlawful
and the burden of producing evidence to rebut the presumption is on the
defendant. 97 As the defendant offered absolutely no evidence to rebut the
presumption, and as the trial judge believed that no reasonable jury could
possibly find for the defendant, the plaintiff was entitled to a directed verdict on
these issues.
Bd.
INSURANCE
RESCISSION OF AUTOIOBILE INSURANCE POLICY PROCURED BY FRAUD

Under Article 6 of the Vehicle and Traffic Law, effective in April 1956,
no motor vehicle can be registered in New York State without a certificate of
insurance or evidence of a financial security bond.' This article further provides
92. Respondent's Brief, 7345 Cases & Points, Case 6. p. 9.
93. 11 A.D.2d 329, 205 N.Y.S.2d 443 (1st Dep't 1960).
94. Kavanagh v. Wilson, 70 N.Y. 177 (1877); 6 Carmody-Wait, New York Practice,
pp. 713-714 (1953).
95. Hull v. Littauer, 162 N.Y. 569, 572, 57 N.E. 102, 103 (1900). See also Der
Ohannessian v. Elliot, 233 N.Y. 326, 135 N.E. 518 (1922).
96. See N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 457-a(1).
97. Clark v. Nannery, 292 N.Y. 105, 54 N.E.2d 31 (1944); Bonnau v. State, 278 App.
Div. 181, 104 N.Y.S.2d 364 (4th Dep't 1951), aff'd, 303 N.Y. 721, 103 N.E.2d 340 (1951).
1.

N.Y. Vehicle and Traffic Law, art. 6, § 312.

